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This paper develops a positive theory of overlapping income taxation
in a federation of states. Its main motivation comes from the observation
that in the U.S. states income tax rates are signiﬁcantly lower than the
federal income tax rate. The analysis shows that in a federal system total
productivity dispersion between the states determines the federal tax rate.
In fact, there exists a positive relation between the level of productivity
dispersion and the federal tax rate, even if the income of the decisive voter
is above the mean income. When the individuals’ income is endogenous,
the higher the implemented federal tax rate is, the lower the resulting state
tax rate will be, even if the decisive voter at the state level has zero pre-tax
income. Empirical evidence obtained from a panel data set on tax schedules
at the state level supports the main hypothesis of the paper. Most notably,
the data points to the existence of a signiﬁcant trade-oﬀ between the states
tax rates and the federal tax rate, explained through productivity dispersion
between the states.
K       : Fiscal Federalism, Political Economy, Income Taxation.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D72, H23, H77
21. Introduction
The main motivation for this paper comes from the observation that states income
tax rates in the U. S. are signiﬁcantly lower than federal income tax rates. Ac-
cording to the TAXSIM model, in the last twenty ﬁve years the average eﬀective
marginal income tax rate at the federal level oscillates around 30% while for a
majority of states the average eﬀective state income tax rate is below 5%, with
nine states during the studied period exhibiting a zero income tax rate.1
From a political economy standpoint the extremely low income tax rates at
the state level are a puzzling observation. It is well established in the positive
literature of income taxation that if the income of the median voter is below
the mean (this is the case for every state within the U.S.), then a majority of
voters (namely those whose income is less than the mean) should prefer large
scale expropriation and redistribution. Several explanations exist for the fact
that, in practice, the rich are not expropriated through the tax system, the most
prominent related to the deadweight loss from taxation (Meltzer and Richard,
1981). But even if voters take into account the deadweight loss from taxation, the
low levels of state income tax rates exhibited in the U.S. are diﬃcult to explain.
1The TAXSIM data referred to is available at http://www.nber.org/~taxsim.
3(This is especially the case for the nine states that have never implemented a
positive income tax rate.) Of course, it would be a mistake to treat states, which
belong to a federation, as separate political entities. While it is the case that in
the U.S. states are free to impose their own income tax rates, that freedom is
restricted by the very existence of a federal income tax. For in a federal system
where tax bases are joint property, state and federal tax settings decisions are
interdependent.
This paper builds a simple model of taxation and redistribution in a two-tier
federal system consisting of a single central government and two state govern-
ments. The federation’s political process works as follows. In the ﬁrst stage
individuals vote for a federal tax schedule that applies to all the residents of the
federation, regardless of their state of residence. At a second stage residents of
each state vote over tax schedules in that particular state. Governments at all
levels use only linear tax-transfer schedules to redistribute income. The political
mechanism considered for all the elections is majority rule.
In the model, individuals are endowed with a productivity level and choose
the amount of labor they supply as a function of the selected tax schedules. This
introduces a trade-oﬀ between the level of output and its distribution, as was
ﬁrst modeled in a political economy context by Romer (1975), Roberts (1977),
4and Meltzer and Richard (1981). The point of departure of this paper is that
individuals, who are assumed immobile, reside in two diﬀerent states and face
overlapping taxes on their income. This framework creates a new source of het-
erogeneity in which individuals diﬀer not only with respect to their productivity
level, but also with respect to their state of residence.2 Consequently, new con-
siderations (besides their own income) inﬂuence the individuals’ preferences over
tax schedules.
When forming their preferences over the state and federal income tax sched-
ules, individuals know that signiﬁcant diﬀerences exist between these taxes. First,
individuals are aware that state and federal tax settings decisions are interdepen-
dent. In particular, individuals rationally anticipate that, because of incentive
considerations, the higher the implemented federal tax rate is, the lower the im-
plemented state’s tax rate will be, even if the decisive voter at the state level has
zero pre-tax income. The second important diﬀerence is that while the state tax
schedule redistributes income within each state, the federal tax schedule implicitly
redistributes income between the states.
The results show that the existence of productivity dispersion between the
2This paper abstracts from mobility of individuals between the states. This assumption allows
me to highlight a diﬀerent mechanism inﬂuencing federal and states’ income tax schedules. See
the conclusions for a detailed discussion of the inﬂuence of mobility on the results of the paper.
5states plays a crucial role in the analysis. Residents of the relatively rich state
always oppose a positive federal tax rate. Individuals with low productivity resid-
ing in the rich state prefer a zero federal income tax rate in order to maximize the
redistribution at the state level. Individuals with high productivity in this state
also oppose federal taxation but simply because taxation, in any form, reduces
their utility. In contrast, residents of the poor state favor a positive federal tax
rate, its level depending on each individual’s productivity level.
Since individuals’ preferences over the federal tax schedule are not monotonic
in their productivity level, a coalition of poor individuals (which constitute a
majority of the federal population) never emerges. In fact, the income of the
decisive voter at the federal level is always above the median federal income and
may even be above the mean federal income. This voter’s preferred federal tax
rate is an increasing function of productivity dispersion between the states. So
if this relatively rich individual is from a relatively poor state she will support
a positive federal income tax rate. The objectives of this individual are twofold.
First, a positive federal tax rate redistributes income toward the individual’s state.
And second, the demand for state redistribution decreases as the federal tax rate
increases. This trade-oﬀ between the federal tax rate and the state tax rate
thereby provides another reason for high productivity individuals in the poor
6state to support a high federal tax rate, ultimately bringing a low state tax rate.
From an eﬃciency standpoint, a federal social contract allowing a two-tier
income taxation system is, in general, not optimal.3 Although the federal tax rate
has a signiﬁcant impact on the equilibrium income tax schedule in both states, this
externality is partially ignored under a decentralized system of decision-making.
In particular, individuals in one state do not take into account the impact of the
federal tax schedule on redistribution in the other state. Obviously, a policy that
takes this externality into account might achieve a welfare improvement for all
the residents of the federation, with greater redistribution and lower taxation.
This provides a possible role for the federal government: to implement policies
that undo the nonoptimal outcome that arises from decentralization. Gordon
(1983) and Wildasin (1991) argue that one such policy is the implementation
of a system of federal matching grants whereby the federal government shares a
proportion of the cost of states’ redistribution. The current paper ﬁnds that such a
system would tend to decrease rather than increase total welfare of the federation’s
residents. The reason being that a federal matching grant system reduces the cost
of state redistribution paid by the state’s population. Consequently, individuals
3A similar conclusion was obtained in the related normative literature (see Gordon, 1983;
Johnson, 1988; Wildasin, 1991; Boadway et al., 1998).
7support higher income tax rates to ﬁnance greater redistribution at the state
level. This in turn implies a high cost in federal matching grants, which have
to be covered with high federal tax rates. Thereby, the implementation of this
s y s t e mc a u s e sh i g h e rl e v e l so ft a x a t i o na n dl o w e rl e v e l so fr e d i s t r i b u t i o n . 4
In the last section of the paper I estimate a number of hypotheses derived from
the theoretical model at hand. Most notably, this empirical exercise corroborates
that productivity dispersion between the states has a statistically signiﬁcant pos-
itive impact on the level of federal income taxes. Furthermore, it is found that an
increase in the federal income tax leads to a decrease in the states income taxes.
These ﬁndings are in concert with the implications of the present model.
2. The Model
Consider a federation of two states, A and B (the analysis is easily generalized to
any number of states). There is a unit mass of individuals living in the federation,
as h a r epA of them resides in state A. Individuals cannot move between the states.
Each individual is endowed with a productivity level w and has no non-labor
4This result contrasts with the one obtained in Wildasin (1991). In his paper, a higher-level
government using corrective matching grants achieves a welfare improvement. In the present
model, however, I assume that all tax schedules are chosen by majority rule. This political
mechanism increases the externalities arising from decentralized decision-making, and thus the
ineﬃciency of a system of overlapping income taxation.
8wealth. Thus, individuals are heterogeneous with respect to their productivity
level and their state of residence. The population of each state is divided into
two classes; in each state i = A,B there is a mass nl
i > 1/2 of low-productivity
individuals (with productivity equal to zero), and a mass nh
i =1− nh
i of high-
productivity individuals with wi > 0.
Individuals choose the amount of labor they provide on a competitive market.
Income is measured in units of consumption and is produced using a constant
returns to scale technology. Hence, an individual with productivity w>0 who
supplies y/w u n i t so fl a b o re a r n sp r e - t a xi n c o m ey.
The federation has a two-tier taxation system: there is a federal and a state
income tax schedule. Both tiers impose linear taxes that are used to collect rev-
enues. These revenues are redistributed lump-sum to the population of individuals
that are subject to that particular tax. The political system of the federation is
such that the federal tax is imposed ﬁrst on the individuals’ pre-tax income; later
on every state imposes its own tax schedule on the remaining of the individuals’
pre-tax income.5
5As an objection to the previous assumption one may argue that the current practice in the
U.S. is that both taxes are paid simultaneously. Assuming that taxes are paid simultaneously
would not change the nature of any of the following results. The adoption of the sequential
timing of the events, which is common in the related literature (cf. Boadway et al., 1998), only
tries to reﬂect the strategic considerations of the residents of a given state when choosing their
own state tax schedule. When doing so, it is reasonable to suppose that these residents take the
9Formally, the federal tax schedule is represented by a tax rate f ∈ [0,1] and a










is satisﬁed. Similarly, the tax schedule of state i is given by the tax rate si ∈ [0,1],
where the state’s redistribution level ri ∈ R+ is obtained from
ri = si(1 − f)pin
h
i yi.
The individuals’ net income is




Given both tax schedules, an individual with productivity wi chooses pre-tax
income yi(wi,si,f) to maximize u(c,
y
w) subject to (2.1). Throughout the paper I
federal tax schedule as given to them.
6This particular form of individuals’ net income is a consequence of the sequential timing in
which the taxes are imposed. Had I assumed instead that both taxes are imposed simultaneously,
we would have obtained that ci =( 1− si − f)yi + rf + ri/pi (see Gouveia and Masia, 1998).
As already pointed out, adopting this diﬀerent speciﬁcation will not change the nature of any
result of this paper.










,c , y ≥ 0, (2.2)
where α is a positive constant and (1/β) is the (constant) elasticity of labor supply.
Under this class of preferences, redistribution at either governmental level does
not aﬀect labor supply decisions and every individual with positive productivity
level chooses to work.
While this is a highly restrictive speciﬁcation of preferences, it captures the
incentive eﬀects of taxes (consumption-leisure trade-oﬀ). Moreover, this speciﬁ-
cation removes a source of considerable complication in the analysis that follows.
In particular, under a general speciﬁcation, redistribution may induce productive
individuals to refrain from working. If every individual in a state has zero pre-tax
income, then a continuum of equilibrium tax rates for this state exists. This in-
determinacy complicates the analysis when solving for the equilibrium federal tax
rate. Finally, the speciﬁcation above (which is widely used in studies of income
taxation; cf. Diamond, 1998; Bohn and Stuart, 2001; De Donder and Hindricks,
2001) is considerably more tractable than a general one, allowing us to obtain
clear, intuitive results.
11For these preferences, given the federal and state tax schedules, the optimal
pre-tax income of an individual with productivity wi > 0 is
yi = wi
 





Note that under the assumed preferences pre-tax income is not a function of
redistribution, either at the federal or state level.
The next section solves for the equilibrium state and federal tax schedules.
3. Federal and States’ Tax Schedules
Voting takes place in two stages: ﬁrst a federal income tax schedule is chosen, and
afterwards each state chooses its own state tax schedule, taking the elected federal
tax schedule as given. Taxes at both the federal and state levels are determined
according to majority rule equilibrium. Whenever the above criterion is satisﬁed
by several tax schedules each is implemented with equal probability.
This section ﬁrst solves for the states’ tax schedules and then for the equilib-
rium federal tax schedule because individuals anticipate the eﬀects of the federal
tax on the state tax.
123.1. Preferences Over States’ Tax Schedules










i wi [(1 − si)wi]
1
β , (3.1)
and state i’s level of redistribution is given by









Since individuals with low productivity constitute a majority of the population
in each state, they choose which tax schedule will be implemented in their state.
To ﬁnd her preferred state tax schedule, a low-productivity individual from state i
maximizes her indirect utility function over the set of feasible state’s tax schedules.
This individual’s indirect utility function is obtained by substituting equations




















i wi [(1 − si)wi]
1
β .
The solution to the associated maximization problem follows. All proofs are
in Appendix A.
13Lemma 1. State i’s equilibrium tax rate si is characterized by
si =

   











This lemma illustrates the relation between federal and states’ tax rates: states
tax rates are decreasing in the federal rate (see Figure (3.1)). An existing trade-oﬀ
between state redistribution and federal redistribution is the main reason behind
this result. Notice that the state’s federal tax bill falls when taxable incomes in
the state are reduced by increased state’s tax rates. Consequently, federal redis-
tribution is decreasing in si. On the other hand, the state level of redistribution
increases in si for any si <β / (β +1 ) . Therefore, only when f (and consequently
rf) is equal to zero low-productivity individuals choose to maximize state redistri-
bution. To choose such a high state tax rate when the federal tax rate is positive
would be too costly in terms of federal redistribution. So as f increases the equi-
librium state tax rate decreases, and the federation shifts redistribution from the
state level to the federal level. When f = β/(β + pi), a positive state tax rate
hurts federal redistribution more than what it contributes to state redistribution.
14Figure 3.1: States’ Tax Reaction Function (for pA >p B)
f
s A, s B
1 + β
β
A p + β
β
B p + β
β
Thus, when the federal tax rates is above β/(β+pi), low-productivity individuals
choose a zero state tax rate.
In addition, the state’s income tax rate decreases with the state’s share of the
overall population pi. As pi increases (for a ﬁxed f) more of the total income in
state i is transferred from the state to the federal level and will be used for redis-
tribution between the states. Therefore, less income is available for redistribution
within the state. A reduction in the state income tax rate is required to partially
oﬀset this disincentive.
Finally, note that si is a concave function of f. This is because of the se-
quential structure of the taxation process. From equation (2.3) follows that the
15individuals’ optimal pre-tax income is not a linear function of the sum of the
tax rates. Due to this multiplicative structure, low-productivity individuals have
to compensate high-productivity individuals with more signiﬁcant decreases in si
(for a given increase in f) as the level of f increases.7 Had low-productivity indi-
viduals not compensated high-productivity individuals this way, the state’s total
income would decrease considerably with f, and consequently the state’s level of
redistribution would decrease as well.
The following subsection solves for the equilibrium federal tax rate.
3.2. Preferences Over the Federal Tax Schedule
In the ﬁrst stage a federal tax schedule is chosen by majority rule. The individuals’
preferences over the federal tax rate are obtained by maximizing their indirect
utility function over the set of feasible federal tax schedules, subject to the states’
reaction functions found in Lemma 1. The resulting preferences over f are a
7Mathematically, totally diﬀerentiating y and setting dy = dw =0we obtain
0=( 1− s)ds +( 1− f)df ,
which implies that ds/df < 0. From a second diﬀerentiation of the last expression we obtain
that also d2s
df 2 < 0.












as the measure of dispersion in total productivity between the states. When x
is close to one, productivity dispersion between the states is relatively low. The
farther away x is from one, the more unequal the states’ total productivity levels.
The dispersion index x combines the original inequality in productivity be-
tween the states together with the elasticity of labor supply. For high values of
β the relative importance of the individuals’ pre-tax income is low, and disper-
sion between the states is mainly determined by the ratio of the share of high-
productivity individuals. As the elasticity of labor supply increases, the diﬀerence
between the individuals’ productivity plays a more signiﬁcant role in the resulting
dispersion between the states. Whenever both states impose the same tax rate x
is equal to the ratio of the states’ total income.8
The proposition below presents the preferred federal tax rate for low-productivity
individuals from state A when the population is evenly distributed between the
8When the analysis is extended to m states, state j’s relevant measure of productivity dis-


















17two states. I adopt this simplifying assumption from now on because it allows
me to obtain closed-form solutions that highlight the basic forces at work in the
model.
Proposition 1. The preferred federal income tax rate for low-productivity






        
        
0 if x ≤ 1,
2β(x − 1)











Figure (3.2) depicts these preferences. To understand the intuition behind
Proposition 1 we need to analyze the impact of the federal income tax rate on
the utility of low-productivity individuals. On the one hand, a positive federal
tax rate implies a positive level of federal redistribution. On the other, more
federal redistribution implies less state redistribution. Therefore, low-productivity
individuals evaluate which tax rate they should increase to maximize their own
utility, knowing that in equilibrium the other tax rate will decrease.
Suppose, for example, that the total productivity dispersion between the states














is less than one. If the federal tax rate is positive, low-productivity individuals re-
siding in A will receive federal redistribution. A positive federal tax rate, however,
has two negative eﬀects on these individuals’ utility. First, it implicitly transfers
income from state A to state B; and second, it lowers their state’s redistribution
level. If instead the federal tax rate equals zero, low-productivity individuals in
A appropriate to themselves part of the transfer between the states through their
state income tax schedule. Low-productivity individuals in state A prefer this
last alternative as it maximizes their total income. If it is the case that x>1
low-productivity individuals in A are now the recipients of redistribution between
19the states. Thus, they prefer a positive federal tax rate.
The level of their preferred federal tax rate is determined by the productivity
dispersion between the states. As x increases, the gains from redistribution be-
tween the states for low-productivity individuals residing in A increase as well.9
Therefore, they prefer a higher federal tax rate. This explains why fA
l is increasing
in x. The cost that this group pays for these gains is a lower redistribution at the
state level. Eventually sA reaches zero and there is no more room to trade-oﬀ an
increase in the federal rate for a decrease in their state’s rate of income taxation,
even for greater levels of productivity dispersion between the states. A further in-
crease of the federal tax rate above this level (without an accompanying decrease
in sA) has a large disincentive eﬀect, lowering federal redistribution. This deﬁnes
the second threshold value of x, above which both the federal and state income
tax rates are constant, namely fA
l =2 β/(2β +1 )and sA =0 .
Due to the symmetry of the analysis, the preferences of low-productivity in-
dividuals in state B are the exact opposite to the ones presented in Proposition
1. Their preferred federal income tax rate, fB
l , is decreasing in x and the relevant
threshold values of productivity dispersion are the inverse of the ones found for
9Whenever the implications of changes in x are analyzed, total productivity at the federal
level (nA
hwA + nB
h wB) is assumed constant.
20fA
l . In particular, fB
l reaches a maximum of 2β/(2β +1 )when x<β / (β +1 ) ,
and a value of zero when productivity dispersion is greater than or equal to one.
In the intermediate range fB
l =2 β(1 − x)/[1 + β(1 − x)].
From the previous argument follows that preferences over f are not monotonic
in the individuals’ productivity level; i.e., individuals with the same productivity
level residing in diﬀerent states have opposing preferences over the federal tax
rate.10 Consequently, low-productivity individuals (which constitute a majority
of the population) never form a coalition to extract as much income as possible
from high-productivity individuals. In other words, the individual with the me-
dian productivity level is not the decisive voter in this framework. Therefore it
is necessary to study high-productivity individuals’ preferences over f to ﬁnd out
whether some consensus may emerge between the diﬀerent groups in the federa-
tion. Only under such a consensus a federal tax rate able to reach the required
support of at least half of the population against any other feasible tax rate will
exist. The preferences of high-productivity individuals from state A appear next.
Proposition 2. The preferred federal income tax rate for high-productivity
10Note that, as the individuals’ indirect utility function is strictly quasinconcave in f, their
preferences over the federal tax rate are single-peaked.






        
        
0 if x ≤ x,
2β(x − x)
x + β(x − x)













It is readily seen from comparing the previous proposition to Proposition 1
that fA
l and fA
h are very similar. Indeed, both functions are increasing in x,
meaning that also high-productivity individuals prefer a positive federal tax rate
for high levels of productivity dispersion. In fact, the same intuition applies here
as in Proposition 1, with one caveat. High-productivity individuals also derive a
beneﬁt and suﬀer a cost from the federal tax schedule. Unlike low-productivity
individuals, the federal tax bill of high-productivity individuals is positive when
the tax rate is positive, this is the cost. The beneﬁts are both experienced at the
state level (from a decrease of their state’s tax rate) and at the federal level (from
federal redistribution). For a high enough dispersion level the beneﬁts exceed the
costs, and thus the preference for positive federal tax rates.
The main diﬀerence between fA
l and fA
h is their threshold values. While fA
l
22is positive for any x above one, fA
h remains equal to zero until x reaches a higher
value. To understand this remember from Lemma 1 that s is a concave function
of f; that is, when f is low an increase in f causes a relatively small decrease in s.
Therefore, for low levels of x the gains that high productivity individuals in state
A obtain from a positive federal tax rate are small compared to the losses they
suﬀer in terms of higher overall taxation. As productivity dispersion between the
states increases the gains that these individuals accrue from federal redistribution
increase as well. Eventually, beneﬁts outweigh costs, deﬁning the threshold value
x above one.









l for x>1.11 Thus, the federal tax rate proposed by a
high productivity individual always obtains a majority over a tax rate proposed
by a low productivity individual. That is,
Corollary 1. The decisive voter over the federal income tax schedule is a high
productivity individual. Consequently, the equilibrium federal income tax rate is
given by fi
h(x).
11For x<1 we obtained in Propositions 1 and 2 that fA
l = fA
h =0 . When x>1 it is simple
to show that
2β(x − 1)
x + β(x − 1)
>
2β(x − x)
x + β(x − x)
↔ x>0,
which is always the case.
23According to this corollary the decisive voter’s productivity level is above the
median productivity.12 This result stands in sharp contrast to the one obtained
in similar models with only one tier of income taxation (Romer, 1975; Roberts,
1977, Meltzer and Richard, 1981). In those models, monotonicity between the
individuals’ productivity level and the rate of their preferred tax schedule is ob-
tained. Thus, under universal suﬀrage, the decisive voter is the individual with
the median productivity level. This is not the case in a federal system of income
taxation. Rather, in a federal system the decisive voter is a relatively produc-
tive individual who, for a wide range of parameter values, chooses to implement
a positive federal income tax rate. More strikingly, an interesting situation may
arise where the decisive voter’s productivity is above the federation’s mean pro-
ductivity, yet this voter selects a positive federal income tax rate. The following
proposition formalizes this observation for individuals in state A.
Proposition 3. If x <x<(2−nh
A)/nh
A then the decisive voter’s productivity
is above the federation’s mean productivity level, yet the equilibrium federal tax
rate is positive.
12Persson and Tabellini (1996) obtain similar results in a diﬀerent framework. In a model
where the federal policy achieves two main goals (risk sharing and redistribution) they ﬁnd that
transfers between the states exacerbates interstate conﬂict, in the sense that residents of the
rich state tend to prefer lower federal tax rates than residents of the poor state.
24According to Proposition 3, for a certain range of x, as income inequality
within a state increases, redistribution in that state decreases. As an illustration,
consider the predictions of the model when wA decreases while wB increases.
Those changes increase the productivity dispersion between the states. Hence, if
the implemented federal income tax schedule is fA
h the resulting federal tax rate
will increase as well. Consequently, both states’ income tax rates will decrease,
even though income inequality in state A increases while in state B decreases;
that is, either a positive or negative relation between the productivity of the
decisive voter and the state’s level of redistribution may arise in a federal system
of income taxation.13 This is perhaps the reason why several studies using data
from the states concluded that there is no empirical support to the claim that a
positive relation between income inequality and government redistribution exists
- the main hypothesis of Meltzer and Richard (1981).14
The next section develops an eﬃciency analysis of a federal social contract
with a two-tier income taxation system.
13While rA will certainly decrease, whether rB decreases or increases depends on the relative
change in wB.
14See for example Gouveia and Masia (1998), and Rodriguez (1999).
254. Eﬃciency Analysis
This section shows that the current federal social contract consisting of a two-
tier income taxation system leads to an equilibrium on the downward sloping
side of the federation’s Laﬀer curve. As already mentioned in the introduction,
when choosing the federal income tax rate an individual in state i ignores the
impact of f on the redistribution level of the other state. Yet, the federal tax
rate has a signiﬁcant impact on the income tax schedule implemented in the other
state. Therefore, the federal tax rate creates an externality that is ignored under a
decentralized system of decision-making. A policy that takes this externality into
account might achieve a welfare improvement for all the citizens of the federation,
with greater redistribution and lower taxation.
This nonoptimal redistributive policy is reminiscent of Gordon (1983), John-
son (1988), Wildasin (1991) and Boadway et al. (1998). These papers develop
a normative analysis of taxation in a federation of states. In their analysis, a
benevolent social planner (maximizing a Benthamite welfare function over the
utilities of current residents of a state) fails to take into account either vertical or
horizontal externalities. (A vertical externality relates to the eﬀects of the states’
policies on federal revenues. A horizontal externality is caused by the mobility of
26individuals between states and the impact of the states’ taxes on nonresidents of
a particular state.) As a consequence of these two externalities ineﬃciency arises.
Several diﬀerences between the current paper’s approach and the one adopted
in the previous literature are worth mentioning. First, the previous papers ab-
stract from political economy considerations, the main focus of the present paper.
Second, in this paper the horizontal externality is assumed away since individuals
are immobile. Finally, given that individuals (and not a social planner) choose the
federal tax rate through majority vote, the vertical ineﬃciency has an opposed
eﬀect to the one obtained in previous papers. Both in Johnson (1988) and in
Boadway et al. (1998) states ignoring the eﬀects of their taxes on federal revenues
tend to implement a higher than optimal income tax rate. In contrast, in the cur-
rent paper states’ tax rates are low while the federal tax rate tends to be higher
than optimal.
To formalize matters, let us consider how the federation’s total redistribution
level reacts to changes in the productivity dispersion between the states. The
federation’s total redistribution is given by





















is the overall productivity level of the federation, which is constant. If the equi-
librium federal tax rate is fA
h , then R is constant for x<xand x>x. For
intermediate values of x, however, total redistribution is strictly decreasing in x.
Lemma 2. R(x) is strictly decreasing in x for x <x<x.
In this same range of productivity dispersion, total income taxation on the
individuals’ income increases with x. That is, for any x <xthe federation as a
whole ends up at the decreasing part of its Laﬀer curve. This is a nonoptimal
outcome as a reduction in income taxes would increase total redistribution.
Proposition 4. If x>xthe equilibrium tax rates of the federation are on the
downward sloping side of its Laﬀer curve.
The intuition is straightforward. When the federal income tax rate is positive
the loss in redistribution in the more productive state (which is not taken into
account by the decisive voter) more than oﬀsets the gain in redistribution in the
less productive state. Proposition 4 does not state, however, that a decrease in the
rate of a given tax will result in a Pareto improvement. Rather, the proposition
establishes that in equilibrium the combination of taxes selected by the individuals
28delivers an outcome inside the federation’s Pareto frontier.
An important reason behind this ineﬃciency is that the federal tax schedule is
the only available policy instrument that redistributes income between the states.
Clearly, a social planner implementing lump-sum transfers between the states and
eliminating one layer of taxation would achieve a Pareto improvement. But even
abstracting from lump-sum transfers, a Pareto improvement can be achieved for
suﬃciently high levels of productivity dispersion by eliminating states’ income tax
schedules.
Proposition 5. There exists a critical productivity dispersion level x∗ < x
such that for every x>x ∗ eliminating states’ income tax schedules results in a
greater utility level for all the individuals in the federation.
The individuals’ impossibility to credible commit to a non-equilibrium strategy
drives the federation to this ineﬃcient outcome. Suppose low-productivity indi-
viduals promise to choose a state income tax rate of zero for any federal income
tax rate. In this situation the resulting federal tax rate equals β/(β +1), the one
preferred by low-productivity individuals in both states. Notwithstanding their
promise, in the second stage of the political process low-productivity individuals
in both states will select a positive state income tax rate as it allows them to
enforce more redistribution. High-productivity individuals anticipate such a de-
29viation in the ﬁrst period and behave accordingly. Hence, the resulting ineﬃcient
equilibrium is inescapable without a commitment mechanism.
But even if a device that outlaws income tax schedules exists only in state
A, an eﬃcient outcome will not be reached.15 If a device that outlaws income
tax schedules exists only in state A, low-productivity individuals in state B are
enjoying the best of both worlds. First, they receive more federal redistribution
given that high-productivity individuals in state A have higher incomes due to
incentive eﬀects. And second, they also receive redistribution at the state level
which there is no reason to give up by setting the state’s tax rate at zero. Thus, for
low-productivity individuals the implementation of a state income tax schedule is
a dominant strategy, that leads the federation to an ineﬃcient equilibrium.
Another policy instrument that may achieve an eﬃciency improvement is the
implementation of a system of federal matching grants. The next subsection
analyzes this policy instrument.
15In some states, like Tennessee, the constitution does not allow the implementation of an
income tax schedule. In others states a supermajority is required for tax rates increments (this
is the case in more than 15 states).
304.1. Federal Matching Grants
In models of ﬁscal competition the federal government might design corrective
schemes that undo the nonoptimal outcomes that arise from decentralized state
decision-making. Wildasin (1991), for example, shows that a system of matching
grants from a federal government to state governments can neutralize the horizon-
tal externalities created by states’ policies, leading the federation to an eﬃcient
outcome.16 It is then natural to explore the implications of such a policy using
the current framework whereby all the taxes are determined according to majority
rule equilibrium, rather than by social planners.
Under a federal matching grants program state i’s budget constraint is given
by
δri = si(1 − f)pin
h
iyi, (4.2)
where δ ∈ (0,1) measures the state’s share of the cost of a dollar’s worth of redis-
tribution. The balanced budget constraint condition at the federal level implies
that









Given that under a matching grants program states are responsible for only a
16A similar suggestion without a formal analysis appears in Gordon (1983).
31share of their redistribution expenses, individuals choose more state redistribution.
A higher federal tax rate is required to pay for part of this greater redistribution
level. As a result we obtain higher income tax rates and lower total redistribu-
tion. Thus, a system of federal matching grants in general enhance the resulting
ineﬃciencies.17
Proposition 6. Under a federal matching grants program, if




A [(1 + δ)(β +1 )− 2]
,
then the overall implemented income tax rates are greater and the federations’ total
redistribution level is smaller than without the matching grants program.
That is, a federal matching grants program under a democratic system might
have the opposite eﬀect than the one obtained when the federal government is
represented by a benevolent social planner. This provides a critical assessment to
the use of federal matching grants as a corrective device that undo externalities
arising from decentralized decision making.
17The result in the following proposition cannot be derived for any productivity dispersion
level without imposing some (suﬃcient) conditions on the parameters. For example, notice that





Another possibility would be to impose restrictions only on δ. In fact, there exists one critical
value δ
∗ such that the stated ineﬃciency is obtained for all δ<δ
∗, for any x.
32The next section provides an empirical analysis of the main implications of the
model.
5. Empirical Analysis
The main goal of this empirical exercise is to estimate the predictions of the
model at hand. The equations I wish to estimate, linearizations of the model-
based reduced forms relating states income tax rates, federal income tax rate,
productivity dispersion between the states and states’ populations are
lnft = θ0 + θ1lnxt + θ2lnpt + εt, (5.1)
and
si,t = γ0 + γ1lnpt−1,i + γ2ft−1 + di +  i,t, (5.2)
where i indexes countries and t indexes time, di is a set of state ﬁxed eﬀects, the
θ
 s and γ s are parameters to be estimated, and  i,t and εt are random error terms.
There are two empirical predictions that follow from the theoretical analysis.
The ﬁrst refers to the equilibrium level of the federal tax rate. In particular, we
expect θ1 to be positive. The second is related to the existent interdependency
between federal and state tax rates. This prediction focuses on the slope of the
33reaction function and not on equilibrium tax levels. Accordingly, we expect γ2
to be negative.18 Combining the two results we can draw conclusions about the
impact of productivity dispersion on states income taxes.
Several econometric issues arise in the estimation of equations (5.1) and (5.2).
First, states within the U.S. are likely to vary considerably in their preferences
over income taxes.19 Thus, the unobserved di, reﬂecting persistent diﬀerences
across states in taxation preferences, is likely to be correlated with the regressors.
To remedy this, state ﬁxed eﬀects are included in (5.2).20 Second, since state
income tax rates are zero for some states for some years, least squares estimates
of equation (5.2) are biased. For this reason the equation is not log-linearized and
Tobit estimation is performed. Third, the states’ population might be inﬂuenced
by the states’ implemented tax rates. To solve this simultaneity problem the
population of each state is lagged one year in the estimation. Finally, the Newey
and West’s robust, consistent estimator for autocorrelated disturbances with an
18The use of the lagged value of the federal tax rate is due to the assumption that the federal
government acts as a Stackelberg leader.
19Tennessee, for example, one of only nine states that do not tax personal income, is known
to be a state with a long history of aversion to income taxes. This aversion dates back to 1931,
when Tennessee Supreme Court ruled that income taxes were unconstitutional. The aversion to
income taxes is still maintained in the year 2002 when, in dealing with a growing budget deﬁcit,
the legislature decided to increase sales taxes rather than to enact an income tax.
20Note that the federal tax rate captures the eﬀects of national changes in policy that may
jointly aﬀect trends in the variables. Therefore, its inclusion in the estimated equation precludes
me from adding time dummies.
34unspeciﬁed structure is used to estimate equation (5.1). This estimator solves the
problem of serial correlation of disturbances across periods.
5.1. Data
The main focus of the empirical exercise is on the variables determining states and
federal income tax rates as well as their interaction. This paper uses annual data
on the states for the years 1977 to 2000 inclusive. I begin by discussing the sources
and constructions of the diﬀerent variables used in the empirical estimation. All
the variables, with their deﬁnitions, means, and standard deviations, are reported
in Appendix B.
States and federal income taxes are taken from the TAXSIM model. In par-
ticular, I use the average eﬀective marginal state income tax rate on wages over
the years 1977 to 2000.21 To ﬁnd these rates, TAXSIM uses the same nationally
representative sample from 1995, properly deﬂated, for each state and year. This
approach allows for comparisons of law without confusing changes in income and
deductions with changes in law.22
The data show that income taxes vary considerably across states. For every
21Sauter (1985) points to several advantages of using this particular deﬁnition instead of the
ratio of income tax revenue to personal income which is used in related empirical studies.
22For further details about the TAXSIM model and the data used in this paper see Feenberg
and Coutts (1993).
35year in the studied sample there are at least 8 states with zero income tax rates.23
On the contrary, several states exhibit over the years income taxes above 5%.
Hawaii and Oregon have the highest average rate (8.35% and 8.25% respectively).
The average eﬀective marginal federal income tax is obtained from the same
source. This tax presents some variation over the years as well. It ranges from
22.92% in 1991 and 1992 to 32.53% in 1981.
I use data on average hourly earnings of production workers on manufacturing
payrolls and the civil labor force of each state to build a proxy for the productivity
dispersion between the states. In order to obtain a number for the measure of
productivity dispersion, a ﬁx value is assigned to the individuals’ constant elas-
ticity of labor supply. Since Stern’s (1976) contribution, it is well known in the
literature of income taxation that the results are inﬂuenced by the particular value
assigned to this parameter. For that reason I carried on several estimations vary-
ing the value of the elasticity of labor supply. The next section reports the results
for β equal to 1/2, 1 and 2. Once the value of productivity dispersion for each
state is obtained, in accordance with the theoretical model, the estimation uses
the median state’s value of productivity dispersion.
23The states of Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washing-
ton and Wyoming exhibit a zero income tax rate for every year in the studied sample. Alaska
imposes a zero income tax rate starting from 1979 and Connecticut has a zero income tax rate
until 1990.
365.2. Results
Table 1 reports the basic ﬁndings. From the estimation of equation (5.1) the gen-
eral pattern that emerges is that an increase in productivity dispersion between
the states leads to an increase in the federal income tax rate. The estimation
indicates that a 1% point rise in productivity dispersion leads to a statistically
signiﬁcant increase of around 2.5% point in the federal income tax rate. More-
over, from a comparison of columns (1), (2) and (3) follows that the impact of
productivity dispersion on the federal income tax decreases as the elasticity of the
individuals’ labor supply increases.
The estimation of equation (5.2) also conﬁrms the hypothesis advanced. The
results show that there is a highly statistically signiﬁcant negative interdependence
between states income tax rates and the federal income tax rate; the coeﬃcient
of -0.071 implies an elasticity of -0.422 computed at the means.
This result contributes to the ongoing debate in the related empirical literature
of strategic interaction among governments. Inspired by the theoretical analysis
of Boadway and Keen (1996), several studies attempt to estimate tax reactions
functions. Besley and Rosen (1998) along with Esteller-Moré and Solé-Ollé (2001)
study interaction in the U.S., focusing on commodity taxes and income taxes re-
spectively; Goodspeed (2000, 2002) conducts similar analyses focusing on income
37taxes in Europe and Hayashi and Boadway (2001) focus on Canadian corporate
income taxes.


































Log Likelihood Function −1057.21
N 24 24 24 1150
Number in parenthesis are robust Standard Errors. Variables are deﬁned in Appendix
B. Equation (4) is estimated with state eﬀects.
While Besley and Rosen (1998) as well as Esteller-Moré and Solé-Ollé (2001)
ﬁnd upward-sloping state reactions functions, the estimations of Goodspeed (2000,
2002) and Hayashi and Boadway (2001) point to a downward-sloping reaction
38function for lower-level governments.24
Combining the two estimations we conclude that productivity dispersion be-
tween the states signiﬁcantly decreases states tax income rates. From the results
above follow that the elasticity of states income tax rates with respect to pro-
ductivity dispersion evaluated at the means oscillates between -1.25, -1.073 and
-0.954 for 1/β equal to 1/2, 1 and 2 respectively.
Finally, the results point to a negative relation between the population’s size
and the income tax rates. While highly signiﬁcant at the federal level, this relation
is only statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level at the state level.
6. Conclusion
This paper developed a positive theory of overlapping taxation in a federation
of states. The main result shows that the existence of productivity dispersion
between the states plays a crucial role in the analysis. Individuals residing in
diﬀerent states have opposing preferences over the federal tax rate. As a conse-
quence, the decisive voter at the federal level has a productivity level above the
median. Yet, this high-productivity individual’s preferred federal tax rate is an
24Among the studies using data on personal income tax, the diﬀerent results may be in part
attributable to the fact that Esteller-Moré and Solé-Ollé (2001) is the only one that includes
horizontal eﬀects.
39increasing function of the productivity dispersion between the states; so if this
relatively productive individual is from a poor state, she will support a positive
rate of federal income tax. A high rate of federal income tax causes, because
of incentive considerations, a low rate of taxation at the state level, ultimately
bringing low state income taxes.
Another result worth mentioning is that a federal social contract allowing a
two-tier income taxation system is, in general, not optimal. The reason for this
is that under a decentralized system of decision-making the federal tax schedule
creates externalities that are partially ignored. Moreover, it is also found that
a system of federal matching grants brings higher tax rates. Higher tax rates
further decrease total redistribution, and thus the total welfare of the federation’s
residents. This contrasts with previous results obtained in the related normative
literature where a system of federal matching grants is welfare improving.
Although it delivers new and interesting results, the model is highly stylized.
Several caveats are worth nothing.
First, the model abstracts from mobility of individuals between the states.
Including this feature to the model adds another layer to the individual’s problem.
Relatively higher tax rates in one state may lead to the emigration of productive
individuals to the other state. Yet, the concentration of rich individuals in one
40state may lead to the immigration of poor individuals. Given that poor individuals
comprise a majority of the population, their immigration will result in higher tax
rates. An equilibrium in such a framework is a ﬁxed-point in which no individual
wishes to move or alter its labor supply, and no state wishes to change its tax
rate given the tax rate chosen by the other state. To guarantee the existence of
such an equilibrium is a challenging task. Using this framework it is very diﬃcult
to come up with a set of simple suﬃcient conditions for existence. A change in
policy implies migratory movements that imply a change in the composition of the
population and, subsequently, another change in policy. This cycle may continue
endlessly.
In any event, I presume that the inclusion of mobility considerations may help
us understand the coexistence of high federal income tax rates with low state
income tax rates. Simply put, the federal government has a monopoly on the
power and ability (however imperfect) to coerce citizens into paying taxes. In the
stylized democracy model of this paper, the federal government is nothing more
than the aggregation of the preferences of a majority of individuals. Given that
at the federal level the poor population will always constitute a majority, federal
tax rates will tend to be high. While federal income taxes are inescapable to
the rich population, such is not the case with states income tax schedules. Tax
41competition among the states will emerge and drive states income tax rates to
low levels.
Another important extension is to introduce a general distribution of pro-
ductivity levels for each state. I believe that the obtained monotonicity of the
preferences of the individuals of a given state over the federal tax rate would be
preserved. Yet, it is not simple to prove it since the characterization of the states
income tax rate as a function of the federal tax rate is cumbersome. Moreover,
this characterization is carried over when solving for the individuals’ preferences
over the federal tax rate.
Similar diﬃculties arise when trying to generalize the individuals’ preferences
to any utility function exhibiting “nice behavior.” For general utility functions
the individuals’ labor supply is a function of the state and federal redistribution
level. Boadway and Keen (1996) show, in a diﬀerent framework, that the slope
of states’ reactions functions to the federal tax is ambiguous. Whether this is the
case as well in a positive analysis without transfers between governments is still
an open question.
Finally, the analysis is restricted to linear taxes for technical reasons. In reality,
however, taxes at both the state and federal level exhibit increasing marginal
rates. Unfortunately, allowing for a richer set of tax schedules might lead to
42voting cycles. Hopefully, future research will help us understand the dynamics
of overlapping income taxation in a federal system imposing fewer restrictions on
the set of feasible taxes.
43A. Appendix A: Proofs

























Strict concavity in si is easily veriﬁed on the relevant domain, and the ﬁrst-order
conditions directly yield the stated results. 
Proofs of Propositions 1 and 2. The proof below solves the maximization prob-
lem for an individual living in state A. A similar procedure yields the results for
a resident of state B.
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where γ =0for the preferences of low-productivity individuals (Proposition 1)
and γ =1for the preferences of high-productivity individuals (Proposition 2).













The Lagrangian for the maximization problem above is:











































The corresponding ﬁrst-order conditions are


































2(β+1)(1−f)2 + θf =0 .
2. LsA ⇒
(1−f)a
































+ λB + θB =0




2(1−f)(β+1),λ i ≥ 0, with complementary slackness.
5. Lθi ⇒ si ≥ 0,θ i ≥ 0, with complementary slackness.
6. Lθf ⇒ f ≥ 0,θ f ≥ 0, with complementary slackness.
45With two inequality constraints and three non-negative variables, there are
32 possible patterns of equations and inequalities. Let us see which ones oﬀer
candidates for a maximum.
The ﬁrst candidate is given by θf ≥ 0,θ i =0 , and λi ≥ 0. These constraints
imply that f =0and si = β/(β +1 ) . Substituting these values into the FOCs
yields that θf ≥ 0 if and only if x ≤ 1+
γ
nh
A(β+1). The inequalities λi ≥ 0 are
satisﬁed for any value of x.
The second candidate is given by λi ≥ 0, and θi = θf =0 . This case correspond
to the interior solution where all the tax rates are positive. From the ﬁrst three
FOCs we obtain the following two equations:
λA =
 
























and replacing λi and si in Lf according to (A.1), (A.2), and Lemma 1 yields
1+x
2β(1 − f)
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x + β(x − x)
,
the results stated in Proposition 1 and Proposition 2.
Finally, the solution for high levels of productivity dispersion is reached when
θf =0 ,λ i ≥ 0 and θi ≥ 0,i= A,B. In this case sA = sB =0and f =2 β/(2β+1).
Substituting the values of the tax rates into the FOCs we obtain that λi > 0 for







Second order suﬃcient conditions are satisﬁed for all the diﬀerent solutions. I
choose to omit these conditions here because they are lengthy and do not provide
additional insights. The details can be obtained from the author upon request.
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which directly yields yA > 1
2(nh
AyA + nh
ByB). Finally, by Proposition 2 we know
that fA




47P r o o fo fL e m m a2 .If x<x by Proposition 2 we know that f<2β/(2β +1 ) ,






2(1 − f)(β +1 )
. (A.3)













is a constant. Diﬀerentiating R with respect to x we obtain
∂R
∂x











which is always negative for β>0. 
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . From Lemma 2 we know that total redistribution is
strictly decreasing in this range. It remains to show that total taxation on the
individuals’ income is increasing in x.
48From Lemma 1 and Proposition 2 follows that





2(1 − f)(β +1 )
+ f.
Diﬀerentiating the previous expression with respect to x we obtain that
d(s + f)
dx
> 0 if and only if f<1 −
1
4(β +1 ) 2.
The above inequality is always satisﬁed since the maximum possible value of f in
equilibrium,
2β
2β+1, is strictly less than 1 − 1
4(β+1)2. 
Proof of Proposition 5. When states taxes are outlawed, low-productivity in-
dividuals in both states have the same preferences over the federal tax schedule.
Hence, they would form a majority at the federal level. Their preferred federal
t a xr a t ei nt h i sc a s ei s
  f =a r gm a x
f
rf s.t. si =0 ; i = A,B.
When x ≥ x the equilibrium income tax schedules are si =0and fA
h =
2β/(2β +1 ) . Thus, in this range state redistribution is zero. Since   f is uniquely
49deﬁned and   f<f A
h we obtain that







That is, for x ≥ x, according to the outcome under   f taxes are lower and
redistribution is greater than according to the equilibrium tax rate fA
h . Thus, for
x ≥ x, the utility of all the individuals in the federation is greater under   f than
under fA
h . In fact, this is the case for every x>x ∗, where x∗ is deﬁned by
rf [f(x
∗),s(x
∗)] + rA [f(x
∗),s(x
∗)] = rf [f
∗,0] 25
Proof of Proposition 6. Under a federal matching grants program, the indirect
utility level of low-productivity individuals in state A is
V
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25Note that the level of redistribution at either the state or federal level is continuous in x.
Furthermore, total redistribution is strictly decreasing in x in the relevant range. Hence, such
an x∗ exists and is uniquely deﬁned.
50obtained by substituting equations (2.3), (4.2), and (4.3) back into (2.2). The
implemented state’s tax schedule in this state is obtained by maximizing (A.4)
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Substituting pi =1 /2 and solving for the preferred federal tax rate as in Propo-
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0 if x ≤ 1,
β(x−1)(1+δ)2







26The indirect utility function V A
l is strictly concave in sA on the relevant domain. Hence,
this is the unique solution, obtained directly from the ﬁrst order conditions.
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As it is the case without federal matching funds, preferences are not monotonic
in w. Therefore, the equilibrium federal tax rate is fA
h (δ). Note that fA
h (δ) ≥ fA
h (1)
for




A [(1 + δ)(β +1 )− 2]
,
establishing the desired result. 
52B. Appendix B: Summary Statistics
Summary Statisticsa
Mean St. Dev. Median Max Min
si 4.54 2.722 5.035 9.87 0
f 26.97 3.197 26.155 32.53 22.92
x0.5 0.984 0.023 0.984 1.025 0.937
x1 0.982 0.025 0.981 1.019 0.92
x2 0.99 0.03 0.995 1.026 0.92
pt 247093 17511 245659 219760 281422
pi 4845 5291 3272 33872 396
a Sources: States and federal average eﬀective marginal tax rates are taken from
the TAXSIM model. The measure of productivity dispersion between the states for
the diﬀerent values of β is built using data on average hourly earnings of production
workers on manufacturing payrolls and the civil labor force, both found in Employment
and Earnings, published by the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Statistics. State
population and federal population are from Statistical Abstract of the United States
( r e p o r t e di nt h o u s a n d si nt h et a b l e ) .
53References
[1] Besley, Timothy and Rosen, Harvey S. “Vertical Externalities in Tax
Setting: Evidence from Gasoline and Cigarettes.” Journal of Public Eco-
nomics, December 1998, 70(3), pp. 383-398.
[2] Boadway, Robin, Marchand, Maurice and Vigneault, Marianne.
“The Consequences of Overlapping Tax Bases for Redistribution and Public
Spending in a Federation.” Journal of Public Economics, June 1998, 68(3),
pp. 453-478.
[3] Boadway, Robin and Keen, Michael. “Eﬃciency and the Optimal Di-
rection of Federal-States Transfers.” International Tax and Public Finance,
May 1996, 3(2), pp. 137-156.
[4] Bohn, Henning and Stuart, Charles. “Voting over Non-Linear Taxes in
a Stylized Representative Democracy.” Mimeo, University of California at
Santa Barbara, 2001.
[5] De Donder, Philippe and Hindricks, Jean. “The Politics of Progres-
sive Income Taxation with Incentive Eﬀects.” Journal of Public Economics,
forthcoming.
54[6] Diamond, Peter A. “Optimal Income Taxation: An Example with a U-
shaped Pattern of Optimal Marginal Tax Rates.” American Economic Re-
view, March 1998, 88(1), pp. 83-95.
[7] Feenberg, Daniel R. and Coutts, Elisabeth. “An Introduction to the
TAXSIM model.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Winter 1993,
12(1), pp. 189-194.
[8] Goodspeed, Timothy J. “Tax Structure in a Federation.” Journal of Pub-
lic Economics, March 2000, 75(3), pp. 493-506.
[9] Goodspeed, Timothy J. “Tax Competition and Tax Structure in Open
Federal Economies: Evidence from OECD Countries with implications to the
European Union.” European Economic Review, forthcoming.
[10] Gordon, Roger H. “An Optimal Taxation Approach to Fiscal Federalism.”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, November 1983, 98(4), pp. 567-586.
[11] Gouveia, Miguel and Masia, Neil A. “Does the Median Voter Model
Explain the Size of the Government?: Evidence from the States.” Public
Choice, October 1998, 97(1-2), pp. 159-177.
55[12] Hayashi, Masayoshi and Boadway, Robin. “An Empirical Analysis of
Intergovernmental Tax Interaction: the Case of Business Income Taxes in
Canada.” Canadian Journal of Economics, May 2001, 34(2), pp. 481-503.
[13] Johnson, William R. “Income Redistribution in a Federal System.” Amer-
ican Economic Review, June 1988, 78(3), pp. 570-573.
[14] Meltzer, Allan and Richard, Scott F. “A Rational Theory of the Size
of the Government.” Journal of Political Economy, October 1981, 89(5), pp.
914-927.
[15] Persson, Torsten and Tabellini, Guido. “Federal Fiscal Constitutions:
Risk Sharing and Redistribution.” Journal of Political Economy, October
1996, 104(5), pp. 979-1009.
[16] Roberts, Kevin W. S. “Voting over Income Tax Schedules.” Journal of
Public Economics, December 1977, 8(3), pp. 329-340.
[17] Rodriguez, Francisco C. “Does Distributional Skewness lead to Redistrib-
ution? Evidence from the United States.” Economics and Politics, July 1999,
11(2), pp. 171-199.
56[18] Romer, Thomas. “Individual Welfare, Majority Voting, and the Properties
of a Linear Income Tax.” Journal of Public Economics, February 1975, 4(2),
pp. 163-186.
[19] Sauter, John J. “On the Construction of Marginal Federal Personal and So-
cial Security Tax Rates in the US.” Journal of Monetary Economics,J a n u a r y
1985, 15(1), pp. 121-135.
[20] Stern, Nicholas H. “On the Speciﬁcation of Models of Optimum Income
Taxation.” Journal of Public Economics, July 1976, 6(1-2), pp. 123-162.
[21] Wildasin, David E. “Income Redistribution in a Common Labor Market.”
American Economic Review, September 1991, 81(4), pp. 757-774.
57